Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008: 5–20 Substance, Reality, and Distinctness BORIS HENNIG Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, D-10099 Berlin ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 22–07–07 ACCEPTED: 16–12–07 aBstract:.Descartes.claims.that.God.is.a.substance,.and.that.mind.and.body.are. two. different. and. separable. substances .This. paper. provides. some. background. that.renders.these.claims.intelligible .For.Descartes,.that.something.is.real.means. it. can. exist. in. separation,. and. something. is. a. substance. if. it. does. not. depend. on.other.substances.for.its.existence .Further,.separable.objects.are.correlates.of. distinct.ideas,.for.an.idea.is.distinct.(in.an.objective.sense).if.its.object.may.be. easily.and.clearly.separated.from.everything.that.is.not.its.object .It.follows.that.if. our.idea.of.God.is.our.most.distinct.idea,.as.Descartes.claims,.then.God.must.be. a.substance.in.the.Cartesian.sense.of.the.term .Also,.if.we.can.have.an.idea.of.a. thinking.subject.which.does.not.in.any.sense.refer.to.bodily.things,.and.if.bodily. things.are.substances,.then.mind.and.body.must.be.two.different.substances keywords:.Clear. and.distinct. ideas,.Descartes,.dualism,.God,.objective. reality,. separability,.substance The.Cartesian.notion.of.substance.is.surrounded.by.mysteries.and.apparently.unacceptable.doctrines .First,.Descartes.claims.that.mind.and.body. are.two.distinct.and.separable.substances .One.might.agree.with.him.to. the.extent.that.there.are.bearers.of.mental.properties.and.bearers.of.physical.ones .But.to.claim.that.these.are.separable.substances.is.much.more. controversial .Second,.Descartes.claims.that.our.ideas.of.substances.have. more.objective.reality.than.other.ideas .But.since.this.should.also.hold.true. of.our.ideas.of.non-existing.substances,.it.would.follow.that.our.idea.of. Pegasus.is.more.objectively.real.than.our.idea.of.Redness .Yet.this.does. not.seem.to.be.true .In.any.case,.how.are.we.to.understand.the.claim.that. reality.comes.in.degrees?.In.this.article.I.will.argue.that.such.difficulties. may.at.least.be.mitigated.by.taking.into.account.how.the.Cartesian.notions. of.substance.and.reality.are.connected.to.Descartes'.distinction.between. confused.and.distinct.ideas .The.following.discussion.is.divided.into.six. sections .First.(1).I.consider.Descartes'.claim.that.the.meditator's.idea.of.a. thinking.subject.is.more.distinct.than.her.ideas.of.sensory.qualities .I.then. 6 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 (2).discuss.Descartes'.notion.of.distinctness,.(3).his.claim.that.our.idea.of. God.is.our.most.distinct.idea,.and.his.notions.of.(4).substance.and.(5).reality .It.will.be.seen.(6).that.an.idea.is.distinct.(in.an.objective.sense).to.the. extent.to.which.its.object.is.real,.separable,.and.substantial 1. The Meditator's Idea of Herself Descartes.emphasizes.that.what.he.is.establishing.in.the.Second.Meditation. is. the.claim.that.we.can.have.a.complete.and.coherent.notion.of.a. thinking.subject.without. in.any.sense.referring. to. the.human.body.(VII. 13) 1.He.introduces.the.notion.of.a.thinking.subject.as.follows .The.only. thing.the.meditator.cannot.possibly.doubt.is.her.capacity.to.doubt.things . To.doubt.is.to.doubt.the.reliability.of.one's.judgment.about.something.and. decide.not.to.rely.on.it .Hence,.doubting.involves.at.least.the.following. activities:.some.activity.that.provides.content.for.a.judgment,.the.formation.of. a. judgment,. and. the.decision.not. to. rely.on. it .This. is.basically. what.Descartes.lists.as.paradigmatic.instances.of.thought.(cogitatio):.a.res cogitans.is.a.res dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens (VII.28) .The.doubting.meditator.does.not. want.to.affirm.a.judgment.based.on.sense.perception.or.imagination .All. we.know.by.the.end.of.the.Second.Meditation.is.that.there.must.be.some. logical.subject.of.the.activities.involved.in.doubting However,.it.seems.that.this.logical.subject.need.not.be.a.substance . A. logical. subject. is. simply.something.of.which.something.else.may.be. predicated,. and. in. this. sense. redness,. velocity,. and.predication.are. also. logical. subjects. (for. one.may.predicate. things.of. redness,. velocity,. and. predication) .Also,.Descartes.has.clearly.not.shown.that.the.logical.subject. of. thought. is.an. incorporeal.substance .The.thinking.thing.may.well.be. identical.to.a.material.thing Descartes. is. well. aware. that. both. claims,. i e . that. the. subject. of. thought.is.a.substance,.and.that.it.is.an.immaterial.one,.require.more.argument .He.does.not.even.use.the.term."substance".in.the.Second.Meditation. (cf .Marion,.1996:.112),.and.all.he.claims.to.have.shown.here.is.that.there. must.be.a.logical.subject.of.thought,.and.that.the.notion.which.this.subject. has.of.herself.must.be.more.distinct.than.her.notions.of.material.things . He.establishes.the.latter.claim.in.the.concluding.sections.of.the.Second. Meditation Descartes.first.points.out.that.the.idea.of.a.logical.subject.of.sensory. qualities.cannot.be.directly.conveyed.by.the.senses .What.our.senses.per1.This.refers.to.Volume.VII,.page.13.of.the.Oeuvres de Descartes,.edited.by.Charles. Adam.and.Paul.Tannery.(Paris,.1996) .I.will.follow.this.convention.throughout.the.paper 7B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness ceive.are.only.qualities,.and.the.logical.subject.of.such.qualities.is.not.a. further.quality .(If.it.were,.it.would.have.to.be.a.quality.of.some.further. logical.subject,.which.would.either.be.unperceivable.or,.again,.a.quality. of.some.further.subject ).Yet,.in.fact,.we.do.not.perceive.mere.properties;. we.always.perceive. things. that.have.properties,.by.virtue.of. these.very. properties 2.Hence.Descartes.concludes.that.the.perception.of.sensory.objects.must.involve.more.than.a.mere.affection.of.the.senses;.it.must.also. involve.something.that.the.thinking.subject.does .From.this.it.follows.that. whenever.we.perceive.sensory.objects,.there.must.also.be.thought .Any. perception.of.a.subject.of.sensory.qualities.involves.thinking .Moreover,. where.there.is.thinking,.there.must.also.be.a.subject.of.thought .(This.does. not.prove.that.there.can.be.no.sensory.quality.in.the.absence.of.a.thinking. subject .Rather,.it.proves.that.only.thinking.subjects,.and.not.merely.sensing.ones,.can.have.the.idea.of.a.bearer.of.sensory.qualities ) Taking.a.further.step,.Descartes.concludes.that.the.meditator's.notion. of.herself.as.a.thinking.thing.must,.therefore,.be.more.distinct.than.any.of. her.notions.of.sensory.objects: If.the.perception.of.wax.appears.to.be.more.distinct.when.it.is.conveyed.not. only.by.the.sense.of.sight.and.touch.but.by.several.causes,.how.much.more. distinctly.must.I.then.admittedly.know.myself;.since.all.reasons.that.could. support.the.perception.of.the.wax.or.of.any.other.bodily.thing.prove.more. evidently.the.nature.of.my.mind!.(VII.33) This.passage.may.be.understood.in.two.ways .First,.Descartes.might.be. arguing.that.one.idea.is.more.distinct.than.another.if.the.former.can.be.derived.from.more.different.sources.than.the.latter .For.one.thing,.however,. it.is.not.clear.why.such.an.idea.should.be.more.distinct,.rather.than.more. reliable.or.confirmed .There.does.not.seem.to.be.a.strong.conceptual.connection.between.distinctness.and.reliability .Moreover,.Descartes.argues. that.the.idea.of.a.pure.mind.is.more.distinct.than.the.idea.of.a.human.being. with.both.bodily.and.mental.attributes .Yet.it.would.seem.that.the.second. idea.stems.from.several.different.sources,.whereas.the.first.emerges.only. in.metaphysical.considerations.such.as.the.Meditations A.second.reading.of.the.argument.may.be.given,.in.which.it.is.based. on.the.following.principle: (*).If.idea.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.idea.B,.then.A.is.less.distinct. than.B Descartes.would.then.be.arguing.that.since.any.idea.of.a.subject.of.sensory.qualities.presupposes.the.idea.of.a.subject.of.thought,.but.not.vice. 2.For.the.general.principle.that.every.property,.mode,.attribute,.or.accident.must.inhere.in.a.substance,.see.VII.79,.176,.and.222 8 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 versa,3.the.latter.presupposes.more.other.ideas.and.is.more.distinct .On.the. face.of.it,.this.second.reading.is.not.much.more.plausible.than.the.first,. since.it.is.not.entirely.clear.why.principle.(*).should.hold.true .In.order.to. see.this,.we.need.first.to.ask.what.it.means.for.an.idea.to.be.distinct 2. Distinctness In.Principia.I.45,.Descartes.writes: I.call.a.perception.clear.that.is.present.and.disclosed.to.the.attentive.mind,. just.as.we.say.that.something.appears.clearly.if.it.moves.the.looking.eye.sufficiently.more.strongly.and.manifestly .I.call.a.perception.distinct.if,.given. that. it. is.clear,. it. is.clear-cut.and.separate.from.others,.such.that. it.plainly. contains.nothing.but.what.is.clear .(VIIIA.22) A.perception.is.clear.to.the.extent.to.which.its.proper.content.is.manifest,.and.distinct. if. its.manifest.content. is.clearly.separate.from.what. is. either.not.its.content.or.not.manifest .In.order.to.understand.this.notion.of. distinctness,.one.needs.to.distinguish.between.two.kinds.of.content.of.a. perception .I.will.refer.to.these.as.(1).proper.and.(2).presupposed.content 4. A.perception.is.distinct.if.its.proper.content.is.separate.from.its.presupposed.content The.Logic of Port Royal.also.distinguishes.between.confusedness.and. distinctness.with.regard.to.the.two.kinds.of.content.of.ideas.(Arnauld.and. Nicole,. 1992) 5.Arnauld. and. Nicole. distinguish. between. different. parts. of. certain. ideas. that. signify. in. either. a. confused. or. a. distinct. way . For. instance, 'the.white'.confusedly.signifies.a.body,.and.distinctly.its.whiteness;.'Aristotle's.opinion' confusedly.signifies.some.opinion,.thought,.or.doctrine,.and. distinctly.the.relatedness.of.this.thought.to.Aristotle,.to.whom.it.is.attributed . (1 8:.61;.cf .2 1:.96) 3.There.are,.according.to.Descartes,.at.least.a.few.thoughts.that.do.not.require.sensory. input.in.any.way;.the.object.of.such.ideas.is.either.God.or.the.soul.(cf .VII.73,.VII.358–9. and.XI.342–3) 4.Gewirth.(1943:.24).draws.a.similar.distinction.between.direct.and.interpretive.content,.and.claims.that.an.idea.is.distinct.if.both.contents.are.identical .However,.whether.the. direct.content.of.an.idea.differs.from.its.interpretive.content.depends.exclusively.on.how. one.interprets.it .Therefore,.Gewirth.cannot.distinguish.between.subjective.and.objective. distinctness.as.I.will.do.below 5.Note.that.Arnauld.and.Nicole's.account.of.distinctness.differs.from.Descartes'.in. important.respects .They.identify.clarity.and.distinctness.(1 9:.63).and.call.the.notion.of.a. res."tres-confus".(1 15:.92);.they.also.allow.for.the.case.of.an.idea.being.confused.because. too.many.distinctions.are.drawn.(2 15:.155,.following.Seneca,.Ep .89 2) 9B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness The.noun.phrase."the.white".explicitly.mentions.the.color.white,.but. it.is.understood.or.presupposed.that.this.color.must.be.the.color.of.some. surface .What.is.presupposed.is.signified.only.confusedly .Likewise,.the. noun.phrase."Aristotle's.opinion".explicitly.mentions.the.relation.of.some. opinion. to.Aristotle,.but.merely.presupposes. that. this.opinion.has.some. content In.this.way,.one.may.distinguish.between.the.distinct.and.confused. content.of.any.idea.of.a.property .Since.all.properties.are.necessarily.properties.of.something,.their.presence.presupposes.the.presence.of.a.property. bearer;.but.they.are.not.ideas.of.such.a.property.bearer .Hence,.they.refer. to.this.property.bearer.in.a.confused.way .To.distinctly.conceive.of.such. an.idea.is. to.focus.exclusively.on.its.proper.rather.than.its.presupposed. content.(cf .VII.46) In.this.sense,.a.distinct.perception.is.not.distinct.in.itself,.but.only.by. being.considered.in.such.a.way.that.its.clear.content.is.separated.from.the. rest .Distinctness.is.only.a.matter.of.how.we.interpret.our.perceptions,.and. two.perceptions.with.exactly.the.same.content.may.differ.in.their.distinctness,.depending.on.how.they.are.conceived.(Gewirth,.1943:.23) .I.will.call. this.subjective.distinctness Descartes.often.uses.the.notion.of.distinctness.in.an.objective.sense . For.instance,.he.writes.that.it.is.sometimes.not.easy.to.tell.which.of.our. ideas.are.distinct.(VI.33,.cf .Gewirth,.1943:.18) .If.distinctness.were.only. a.matter.of.how.we.conceive.of.a.perception,.this.would.not.be.difficult;. for.even.if.we.know.nothing.else,.at.least.we.know.how.we.perceive.things. (VII.29) .Further,.Descartes.often.refers.to.distinct.ideas.simply.by.citing. their.content:.he.claims.that.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.any.other. idea,.apparently.regardless.of.how.it.is.conceived.(VII.46) .There.seem.to. be.certain.ideas.that.are.simply.more.distinct.than.others .However,.it.is. not.at.all.clear.how.ideas.should.differ.in.their.degree.of.objective.distinctness .One.might.think.that.the.degree.to.which.an.idea.is.objectively.distinct.is.the.degree.to.which.it.may.possibly.be.rendered.distinct .Although. I.will.argue.that.this.is.not.quite.what.Descartes.means,.let.me.first.cite. some.evidence.in.favor.of.this.account The.opposite.of.distinctness.is.confusedness;.and.if.perceptions.differ.in.the.degree.to.which.they.may.be.rendered.distinct,.there.should.be. ideas.that.are.necessarily.confused.to.a.certain.extent .And.indeed,.sensory. impressions.and.feelings.seem.to.be.necessarily.confused.(VII.43) .Such. phenomena.involve.both.body.and.mind,.and.so.it.seems.they.cannot.be. conceived.in.a.perfectly.distinct.way .Notions.of.unity.(of.body.and.mind). have.more.presupposed.content.than.ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.since.they. presuppose.not.just.one.property.bearer,.but.two.–.unity.is.an.accident.of. both.united. items. (VII.435;.Hoffman.1990) .According. to.principle. (*). 10 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 above,.this.should.mean.that.notions.of.unity.are.even.less.distinct.than. ideas.of. sensory.qualities .The. following.observation. seems. to. confirm. this .Descartes.sometimes.divides.all.notions.into.three.classes:.those.pertaining.exclusively.to.the.mind;.those.pertaining.exclusively.to.extended. things;.and.those.describing.the.way.in.which.mind.and.body.are.united. (III.665) .In.Principia.I.54,.however,.he.mentions.only.two.kinds.of.distinct.notions: And.therefore.we.can.easily.have.two.clear.and.distinct.notions.or.ideas:.one. of.the.created.thinking.substance,.the.other.of.bodily.substances;.if.we.carefully.separate.all.attributes.of.thought.from.attributes.of.extension .(VIIIA. 25–26) Thus.it.may.seem.that.all.notions.pertaining.to.the.unity.of.body.and.mind. are.not.distinct,.but.rather.necessarily.confused .They.must.be.confused,.it. seems,.since.they.lump.body.and.mind.together Accordingly,.one.might.argue.that.for.a.notion,.idea,.or.perception.to. be.objectively.distinct.is.for.it.to.be.separable.from.other.notions,.ideas,. and.perceptions .This.would.explain.why. ideas.of. sensory.qualities.are. less.distinct.than.ideas.of.substances:.the.first.cannot.be.separated.from. the.second,.whereas.the.second.may.be.separated.from.the.first .(Every. sensory.quality.must.be.a.quality.of.something,.but. there.can.be. things. without.sensory.qualities ).Therefore,.a.notion.of.how.mind.and.body.are. related.cannot.be.very.distinct,.since.it.cannot.be.separated.from.the.two. notions.of.the.united.things,.i e .the.mind.and.the.body However,.we.cannot. attribute. to.Descartes. an. account.of.objective. distinctness.according.to.which.there.are.necessarily.confused.ideas .The. problem.is.that.Descartes.does.claim,.in.a.letter.to.Princess.Elisabeth,.that. there.is.a.way.of.considering.notions.of.unity.apart.from.the.notions.of.the. united.things .One.can."conceive.of.the.notions.that.belong.to.the.union. of.body.and.mind.apart.from.those.which.belong.only.to.the.body.or.only. to.the.mind".(III.666) 6.Hence,.there.is.a.way.of.distinguishing.the.proper. content.of.notions.of.unity.from.the.content.they.presuppose .Our.ideas. of.how.body.and.mind.are.united.have.clear.content,.and.it.is.possible.to. focus.on.this.exclusively This.raises.the.following.problem .First,.Descartes.writes.that.to.distinctly.conceive.of.an.idea.is.to.separate.its.proper.content.from.all.content. really.belonging.to.other.ideas .Second,.the.suggestion.being.considered. here.is.that.an.idea.may.be.called.objectively.distinct.if.it.is.possible.to. 6.In.VIIIA.22,.Descartes.also.writes. that.pain. is.not.always.distinct;.hence. it.may. be.distinct .In.VII.83.and.Principia.I.66-70.he.implies.that.all.actual.confusion.rests.on. misinterpretation 11B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness conceive.it.distinctly .However,.Descartes.claims.that.we.may.separate.the. content.of.our.least.distinct.ideas,.namely.our.notions.of.the.union.of.mind. and.body,.from.the.content.of.all.other.ideas .This.implies.that.notions.of. unity.may.be.conceived.in.a.perfectly.distinct.way .Hence,.ideas.do.not. differ.in.the.degree.to.which.they.may.be.distinctly.conceived But.although.there.are.no.necessarily.confused.ideas,.there.are.ideas. that.lend.themselves.more.easily.to.confusion .The.idea.of.a.sensory.quality,.for.instance,.easily.leads.to.the.assumption.that.there.is.something.in. the.world.which.possesses.it .This.is.part.of.its.presupposed.content;.and. the.proper.content.of.such.ideas.may.be.confused.with.their.presupposed. content,.such.that.they.are.mistaken.for.ideas.of.quality.bearers .Similarly,. the. ideas. of. heat. and. weight. lead. us. to. the. assumption. –. mistaken. according.to.Descartes.–.that.there.are.hot.and.heavy.objects.in.the.world . Further,.we.are.inclined.to.think.that.the.weight.of.a.body.moves.it.downwards,.just.as.the.soul.may.move.the.human.body .This.is.a.confusion.of. mental.and.physical.properties.(VII.441) .It.does.not.follow.that.ideas.with. more. presupposed. content. are. necessarily. more. confused . But. they. are. more.easily.confused.with.what.they.presuppose Hence,.one.should.define.the.notion.of.objective.distinctness.as.follows: An.idea.A.is.objectively more distinct.than.another.idea.if.and.only.if.it.is. easier. to.distinguish.A's.proper.content.from.A's.presupposed.content.(for. instance,.because.A.does.not.have.as.much.presupposed.content.as.the.other. idea) This.explains.why.principle.(*).above.holds.true .If.idea.B.presupposes. idea.A,.but.not.vice.versa,.B.will.probably.have.more.presupposed.content. than.A .Therefore,.B's.content.is.more.easily.confused.with.A's,.whereas. A's.content.is.more.easily.separated.from.B's 3. God According.to.Descartes,.the.idea.of.God.presupposes.no.other.idea,.and. hence.it.is.the.most.distinct.of.all.our.ideas .As.I.have.argued,.this.does.not. mean.that.no.other.idea.could.be.equally.distinct.(in.the.subjective.sense) . As.Descartes.shows,.one.may.derive.the.notion.of.God.from.the.idea.of. thought;.and.this.means.that.the.idea.of.a.thinking.subject.has.some.presupposed.content .The.existence.of.God.is.presupposed.by.the.existence.of. a.thinking.subject,.and,.in.this.sense,.we.have.an.idea.of.God.even.before. we.have.a.clear.idea.of.ourselves.(VII.45) That.the.idea.of.God.can.be.derived.from.the.idea.of.a.thinking.subject. does.not.mean. that. it. depends.on. this. idea . In.order. to.understand. 12 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 Descartes'.argument,.we.need.to.recall.that."thought".is.a.general.heading. for.all.activities.that.are.involved.in.doubt .In.his.proof.of.the.existence. of.God,.Descartes.takes.up.this.idea.by.pointing.out.that.doubt.implies.a. certain.limitation .A.thinking.subject.who.knows.everything.would.also. know.that.she.knows.everything,.and.hence.she.would.have.no.reason.for. doubting.anything .The.Cartesian.meditator,.however,.does.have.reason.to. doubt.various.things;.hence,.she.does.not.know.everything .Further,.lack. of.knowledge.is.a.privation.for.a.thinking.subject.(VII.54–5) .Whenever. one.can.rightly.say.that.a.subject.does.not.know.everything,.there.must.be. more.of.what.such.a.subject.could.possibly.know .For.to.know.everything. is.to.know.everything.that.can.be.known,.and.not.to.know.everything.is. not.to.know.everything.that.can.be.known Hence,.the.idea.of.a.doubting.subject.presupposes.the.idea.of.further. knowledge. to.be.had . It.does.not. follow.from.this. that. there.actually. is. a.subject.having. this.knowledge .But. the.notion.of.God.as.a.subject.of. knowledge.is.dubious,.in.any.case .God.does.not.think.in.the.same.sense. in.which.the.Cartesian.thinking.subject.does .Descartes.uses."thought".as. a.label.for.all.activities.involved.in.doubting;.but.God.has.no.reason.to. doubt.anything .To.be.sure,.the.fact.that.all.activities.involved.in.doubting. are.thoughts.does.not.imply,.conversely,.that.all.thinking.involves.doubt . Yet.it.is.at.best.an.open.question.whether.there.can.be.a.thinking.thing.that. never.doubts .Further,.as.Descartes.sometimes.writes,.God's.knowledge. cannot.be.separated.from.his.will,.since,.for.God,.to.know.something.is.to. bring.it.into.existence.(I.149,.IV.119) .Since.everything.is.at.once.created. and.known.by.God,.he.cannot.be.mistaken.about.what.exists .Therefore,. he.cannot.doubt.anything .To.call.God.an.infinite.thinking.substance,.as. Descartes.does,.is.therefore.misleading .It.might.be.better.to.follow.Augustine.and.identify.God.with.Truth.itself The.only.reason.why.God.may.be.called.a.thinking.substance.is.that. this. is.how.he. is.known. to. the.Cartesian.meditator .God. is.known.as.a. thinking.substance.because.only.the.idea.of.thought.(i e .all.activities.involved.in.doubting).presupposes.the.existence.of.something.beyond.the. thinking.subject .For,.as.Descartes.writes,.there.is.no.reason.why.it.should. be.impossible.for.the.thinking.subject.to.have.developed.its.ideas.of.all. corporeal.and.sensory.things.merely.from.itself:."As.for.the.ideas.of.corporeal.things,.there.is.nothing.in.them.that.would.be.so.great.that.it.could. not.originate.from.myself...".(VII.43–4) .The.only.idea.that.the.thinking. subject. could. not. derive. from. the. idea. of. itself. is. the. idea. of. a. perfect. thinking.subject.(or,.more.appropriately,.the.idea.of.God.as.Truth.personified) In.any.case,.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.the.meditator's.idea. of.herself,.since.it.does.not.presuppose.any.other.idea,.but.is.presupposed. 13B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness by.the.idea.of.thought .Yet.this.does.not.clarify.in.what.sense.it.would.be. appropriate.to.call.God.an.infinite.thinking.substance;.and.indeed,.it.is.still. not.clear.in.what.sense.the.mind.is.one .All.we.know.so.far.is.that.the.idea. of.God.is.the.most.distinct.of.our.ideas .It.remains.to.be.shown.that.such.a. distinct.idea.must.also.be.the.idea.of.a.substance 4. Substances In.order.to.understand.why.our.most.distinct.ideas.must.be.ideas.of.substances,.we.need.to.ask.what.Descartes.means.when.he.calls.something.a. substance .He.gives.two.explicit.definitions.of.this.notion .The.first.occurs. in.the.appendix.to.his.Second Replies: Everything.in.which.something.that.we.perceive.(i e .some.property,.or.quality,.or.attribute.of.which.there.is.an.actual.idea.in.us).inheres.immediately. as.in.a.subject,.or.by.which.it.exists,.is.called.a.Substance .Strictly.speaking,. we.do.not.have.any.idea.of.a.substance.in.itself.other.than.that.it.is.a.thing. in.which.that.which.we.perceive,.or.that.which.is.objectively.in.any.of.our. ideas,.exists.formally.or.eminently;.because.it.is.known.by.the.natural.light. that.nothing.can.be.an.attribute.of.no.real.thing .(VII.161) This. is.basically. the.Aristotelian.notion.of.a. substance:. that. in.which.a. property,.mode,.or.attribute.inheres.(Categories.and.Metaphysics Δ8). According. to. Suárez,. this. definition. of. the. term. "substance". may. be. etymologically.derived.from.the.Latin.verb.substare:.to.underlie.something . That.something.underlies.another.thing.means.that.the.latter.may.be.truly. predicated.of.the.former;.hence.one.can.say.that.something.underlies.another.thing.in.at.least.three.distinct.senses .First,.a.thing.may.be.said.to. underlie. its.properties.and.qualities:. they.are.exemplified.by. this. thing . Second,.a.thing.may.be.said.to.underlie.its.kind:.the.kind.is.instantiated. by.this.thing .Third,.a.quality.may.be.said.to.underlie.its.kind,.or.a.determinate.universal.may.be. said. to.underlie. its.determinable;. as.when.we. say.that.scarlet.is.a.kind.of.red .Scarlet,.however,.is.not.a.substance .One. should.therefore.add,.following.Suárez,.that."a.substance.underlies.the.accidents.such.that.it.does.not.require.a.similar.substratum".(Disputationes Metaphysicae.XXXIII.1 1) As.at.the.end.of.the.Second.Meditation,.Descartes.emphasizes.here. that.substances.are.objects.of.thought,.not.of.sense.perception .He.writes. that.we.can.have.no.idea.whose.only.content. is.a.substance .There.are,. accordingly,.no.pure. substances. in.Descartes'.metaphysical. framework . He.consistently. refers. to.substances.by.way.of.what.he.calls."principal. attributes".(Principia.I.53.and.63;.V.156) .Principal.attributes.have.a.special.status:.their.ideas.not.only.presuppose.the.substance.they.inhere.in,. but.are.as.close.to.this.substance.as.is.possible .The.idea.of.extension,.for. 14 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 instance,. presupposes. the. idea.of. an. extended. thing,.but. the. idea.of. an. extended. thing.presupposes,. in. turn,. the. idea.of.extension .There. is.not. even.a.clear.distinction.between.an.extended.substance.and.its.extendedness.–.extension.itself.is.extended .For.this.reason,.the.idea.of.an.extended. substance.cannot.be.more.objectively.distinct.than.the.idea.of.extension . Likewise,.the.idea.of.thought.presupposes.the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing,.but. the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing.also.presupposes.the.idea.of.thought The.definition.of."substance".in.the.Second.Replies.involves.the.notions.of.formal,.eminent,.and.objective.reality,.which.I.will.discuss.in.a. moment .For.now,.it.is.sufficient.to.note.that.Descartes.does.not.suppose. that.every.quality.must. inhere. in.an.actually.existing.substance . It.may. also.exist.objectively,.that.is,.only.as.the.object.of.an.idea .Only.the.formal. or.eminent. reality.of.a.quality. requires.a. really.existing.substance. (and. the.formal.existence.of.an.idea.requires.the.real.existence.of.a.thinking. subject) The.second.definition.of."substance,".which.Descartes.gives.in.Principia.I.51,.is.more.akin.to.the.notion.of.substance.which.Suárez.derives. from.the.Latin.verb.subsistere 7.In.this.sense,.a.substance.is.what.abides . Descartes.writes: By.substance.we.can.understand.nothing.but.a. thing. that.exists. in.such.a. way.that.it.depends.on.no.other.thing.for.its.existence .And.of.course,.we.can. think.of.only.one.substance.that.does.not.at.all.depend.on.anything,.namely. God .We.realize.that.all.other.substances.cannot.exist.without.the.aid.of.God . Yet.the.term.substance.does.not.apply.to.God.and.to.them.univocally,.as.they. say.in.the.schools;.that.is,.we.cannot.distinctly.conceive.of.any.signification. of.this.term.that.would.be.common.to.God.and.to.creation .(VIIIA.24) According.to.this.definition,.a.substance.is.something.that.does.not.depend.on.any.other.thing.for.its.existence .If.a.thing.depends.on.another. thing.for.its.existence,.the.idea.of.this.thing.may.be.said.to.presuppose.the. idea.of.that.other.one .Hence,.ideas.of.dependent.entities.lend.themselves. to.greater.confusion,.as.there.is.more.content.that.might.be.confused.with. their.proper.content .This.clarifies.in.what.sense.ideas.of.substances.are. more.distinct.than.other.ideas:.they.have.less.presupposed.content These. two. definitions. of. a. substance. may. be. taken. as. referring. to. two.different.ways.in.which.one.thing.can.be.said.to.depend.on.another . First,.qualities.inhere.in.their.bearer;.hence.ideas.of.qualities.confusedly. signify.the.bearers.of.these.qualities .Second,.something.may.depend.on. something.else.as.the.cause.of.its.existence .It.is.in.this.way,.according.to. 7.Disputationes Metaphysicae.XXXIII.1 1 .Suarez.refers.to.Augustine,.De Trinitate. 7,.4,.9:.ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus .Cf .Flasch,.1986:.84:."'Wirklich'. ist.danach,.was.bleibt " 15B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness Descartes,.that.the.thinking.subject.depends.on.God .The.thinking.subject. is.not.a.quality,.mode,.or.attribute.of.God,.and.thus.it.is.a.substance.in.the. first.sense .But. the. thinking.subject.depends.on.God.as. the.cause.of. its. existence;.and.so.while.it.is.not.a.substance.in.the.strict.sense.of.the.second.definition,.it.still.qualifies.as.a.substance.in.a.less.strict.sense,.since. it.depends.on.God.alone.for.its.existence,.and.not.on.anything.else.(VIIIA. 24–5) .Qualities,.in.contrast,.depend.on.another.substance.for.their.reality,. and.this.other.substance.depends.on.God 8 5. Reality There.is.thus.a.hierarchy.of.ideas.in.terms.of.objective.distinctness.and. presupposed.content .Ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.for.instance,.presuppose. ideas.of.extended.substances.as. their.bearers,.and. these. in. turn.presuppose.the.ideas.of.thought.and.of.a.cause.on.which.they.depend.for.their. existence .The.idea.of.doubt.implies.the.idea.of.a.finite.thinking.substance,. and.this.presupposes. the.idea.of. truth .The.idea.of.God.presupposes.no. further.idea .In.this.sense,.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.the.idea.of. a.finite.thinking.substance,.and.the.idea.of.a.finite.thinking.substance.is. more.distinct.than.ideas.of.sensory.properties Descartes.describes.exactly.this.hierarchy.in.the.Third.Meditation;.but. there.he.writes.that.the.idea.of.God.contains.more.objective reality.than.the. idea.of.any.other.substance,.and.that.ideas.of.substances.in.general.contain. more.objective.reality.than.ideas.of.modes.and.accidents .He.writes: The.ideas.that.present.substances.to.me.are.without.doubt.somewhat.more,. or,.as.they.say,.contain.more.objective.reality.in.them,.than.those.that.represent.only.modes.or.accidents .Again,.the.idea.by.which.I.conceive.of.some. eternal,.infinite,.omniscient,.and.omnipotent.God.who.is.the.creator.of.all. things.other.than.himself.certainly.contains.more.objective.reality.than.those. by.which.finite.substances.are.presented .(VII.40) As.is.well.known,.it.would.be.erroneous.to.suppose.that.ideas.with.an. objective.reality.have.a.real.object,.or.are.objectively.valid.in.the.modern. sense.of."real".and."objectively".(Cronin,.1987;.Wells,.1993) .In.the.scholastic.terminology.employed.by.Descartes,.that.something.is.objectively. real.does.not.at.all.mean. that. it. really.exists. in. the.outside.world .That. something.is.objective.simply.means.that.it.is.an.object.of.something;.and. ideas.may.have.objects.which.do.not.really.exist .As.for.reality,.the.following.passage.from.the.Sixth.Replies.is.revealing: 8.The.way.in.which.sensory.qualities.depend.on.the.thinking.subject.is.a.still.different.one:.they.depend.for.their.existence.not.on.it,.but.rather.on.something.that.can.only.be. grasped.by.thought 16 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 Further,.it.is.entirely.incoherent.to.assume.real.accidents,.because.whatever. is.real.can.exist.in.separation.from.every.other.subject;.and.what.can.exist. thus.separately.is.a.substance,.not.an.accident .(VII.434) Real.attributes.are.assumed.in.order.to.explain.how,.in.the.context.of. the.sacrament.of.Communion,.the.bread.changes.into.the.body.of.Christ:. the.substance.changes,.while.its.accidents.remain.identical .However,.this. is.possible.only.if.the.accidents.can.be.identified.as.the.same.before.and. after. the.substantial.change;.and.Descartes.denies. that. this. is.possible 9. When.he.says.that.accidents.are.not.real,.he.is.making.a.point.about.the. way.in.which.they.are.individuated.and.re-identified.as.the.same .One.can. only.individuate.accidents.and.identify.them.as.the.same.by.individuating. and. identifying. their. bearer . For. instance,. two. different. slices. of. bread. may.have.exactly.the.same.color,.yet.different.instances.of.this.color .If. this.is.the.case,.the.two.instances.of.this.color.can.only.be.distinguished. by.reference.to.their.bearer:.one.is.the.color.of.the.first.slice,.while.the. other.is.the.exactly.similar.color.of.the.second.slice .This.is.the.sense.in. which.accidents.depend.on.substances:.they.are.real.(separable.and.enduring.individuals).only.because.substances.are.real.(separable.and.enduring. individuals) 10 It. should.be.noted. that.principal. attributes.have.a. status. analogous. to.Aristotelian. substance. predicates. or. Strawsonian. sortal. universals 11. Whereas.accidents.are.individuated.in.terms.of.their.bearer,.attributes.are. features.in.terms.of.which.substances.are.individuated.and.identified.as. the.same .Attributes.are.not.accidents,.but.essences In.any.case,.to.be.real.is.to.be.a.separable.res,.and.accidents.are.not. res .Accidents.are.not.real.because.they.cannot.be.individuated.in.separation.from.their.bearer .Further,.Descartes.assumes.that.there.are.degrees. of.reality,.and.this.can.only.be.understood.by.assuming.that.something.is. real.to the extent to.which.it.may.exist.and.be.individuated.in.separation . Separability.is.a.comparative.notion,.since.some.things.are.more.separable. from.all.the.rest.than.others Descartes.distinguishes.three.kinds.of.reality .The.most.basic.kind.is. formal.reality.(which.he.also.calls.actual.reality;.VII.41) 12.If.reality.is.the. . 9.As.Arnauld.points.out,.Descartes.denies.that.there.is.a.substance.beyond.the.attribute.of.extension.which.might.change.from.being.bread.to.being.Christ.(VII.217–8;.cf . VII.248–56) 10.O'Neill,.1987:.231:."It.appears.that.'reality'.will.have.to.get.fleshed.out.in.terms. of.some.complex.notion.of.relative.independence ".She.refers.to.VI.35,.VII.138.and.VIIIA. 13–14 11.See.Code.(1986).and.Strawson.(1959:.167–73) 12. In. VII. 8. and. 232. Descartes. also. speaks. of. material. reality,. thereby. apparently. confusing.his.own.terminology .For.a.possible.coherent.reading,.see.Kemmerling,.1996:. 39–42 17B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness same.as.separability,.then.the.formal.reality.of.a.thing.is.its.actual.separability .An.actually.existing.substance,.such.as.God,.a.thinking.thing,.or.an. extended.body,.is.real.to.the.extent.to.which.it.may.be.individuated.and. identified.without.individuating.and.identifying.other.things Ideas.and.thoughts.have.objective.reality.to.the.extent.to.which.their. objects.are.real.(formally,.objectively,.or.eminently) .This.is.why.the.idea. of.God.has.the.most.objective.reality:.God.is.most.separable,.hence.the. idea.of.God.has.the.most.separable.object .But.the.object.of.an.idea.need. not.be.formally.real .An.idea.can.have.another.idea.as.its.object,.or.it.can. have.an.object.which.has.eminent.reality The.eminent.reality.of.a.thing.is.the.reality.(separability).of.what.it. can.produce.without.further.assistance.(cf .O'Neill,.1987:.235–40) .For. instance,.since.the.thinking.subject.can.produce.certain.ideas.and.thoughts. without.further.assistance,.these.ideas.and.thoughts.are.eminently.real.in. the. thinking. subject .The. degree. of. eminent. reality. which. a. thing. possesses.depends.ultimately.on.the.degree.of.reality.of.what.it.may.produce. without.further.assistance .If.the.thinking.subject.could.produce.the.idea. of.God.without.further.assistance,.it.would.have.as.much.eminent.reality. as.the.idea.of.God.has.objective.reality;.and.the.idea.of.God.has.as.much. objective.reality.as.God.has.formal.reality .However,.the.thinking.subject. does.not.have.as.much.eminent. reality.as.God.has. formal. reality,.since. otherwise.it.would.also.be.able.to.produce.God,.and.not.just.the.idea.of. God 13.From.this.it.follows.that.the.thinking.subject.cannot.even.produce. its.own.idea.of.God .There.must.be.something.other.than.the.thinking.subject.with.enough.formal,.objective,.or.eminent.reality.to.engrave.the.idea. of.God.on.the.thinking.subject's.mind 6. Conclusion We.can.now.tie. the.various.strings. together .For.Descartes,. substantiality,.separability,.and.formal.reality.amount. to. the.same.thing .An.entity. is.more. real.and.substantial. than.another. if. it. is.more.separate.or.more. separable .Properties,.modes,.and.accidents.are.less.real.than.substances. because.they.are.not.separable.from.substances .Instances.of.properties,. modes,.and.accidents.can.only.be.individuated.by.individuating.their.bearers .Attributes.are.as. real.as.substances .The.reason. is.not. that. they.are. separable.from.substances.(for.they.are.not),.but.that.substances.are.like13.By. the. same. token,. the. thinking. subject. can.produce.without. further. assistance. only.such.ideas.whose.object.is.the.thinking.subject.itself.or.something.that.the.thinking. subject.can.produce.without.further.assistance .These.are.only.the.ideas.of.pure.mind.and. pure.extension,.as.developed.in.the.Second.and.Fifth.Meditations .For.all.other.ideas,.the. mind.depends.on.God.or.the.human.body 18 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 wise.not.separable.from.their.attributes,.and.are.individuated.in.terms.of. their.principal.attributes Furthermore,.an.idea.of.a.more.separable,.real,.and.substantial.entity. has.more.objective.reality .Ideas.of.substances.have.more.objective.reality.than.ideas.of.properties,.modes,.and.accidents,.because.substances.are. more.real.(separable).than.properties,.modes,.and.accidents Finally,.an.idea.which.has.more.objective.reality.than.another.is.also. more.distinct .Ideas.of.properties,.modes,.and.accidents.have.more.presupposed.content.than.ideas.of.substances,.and.thus.it.is.less.easy.to.focus. exclusively.on.their.proper.content .The.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than. any.other. idea,.because. it.has. less.presupposed.content. than.any.other:. God.is.more.independent,.and.thus.more.separable.and.real,.than.anything. else .Hence,.the.distinctness.of.an.idea.directly.corresponds.to.its.objective.reality:.ideas.with.more.real.objects.are.also,.in.an.objective.sense,. more.distinct .This. is.why.Descartes.can.rely.on.principle.(*).above:. if. idea.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.idea.B,.A.is.less.distinct.than. B .Objects.of.distinct.ideas.are.more.real.and.more.separable.than.those. of.confused.ideas,.and.if.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.B,.then.its. object.is.not.as.separable,.real,.and.substantial.as.B's.object .Based.on.this,. we.can.answer.several.questions.that.have.emerged.in.this.paper First,.Descartes'.conception.of.reality.in.terms.of.separability.explains. how.reality.can.be.a.matter.of.degree .Something.is.real.to.the.extent.to. which.it.is.a.separable.res .In.the.strictest.sense,.only.God.is.real,.since. only.God.is.separable.from.all.other.things.(there.are.no.other.things.on. which.God.depends) .In.a.comparative.sense,.the.thinking.subject.is.more. real.than.sensory.qualities,.while.the.latter.are.more.real.than.the.union.of. mind.and.body Why.is.God.a.substance?.Descartes'.argument.for.the.substantiality.of. God.relies.on.the.observation.that.substances.are.separable.things,.and.that. our.ideas.of.them.are.therefore.objectively.distinct:.it.is.easier.to.separate. and.clearly.distinguish.what.belongs.to.them.from.what.does.not.belong.to. them 14.Descartes.shows.in.the.Third.Meditation.that.our.idea.of.God.must. be. the.most.distinct. idea,.since. it. is.presupposed.by.all.other. ideas.and. does.not.rest.on.any.further.one .Since.more.distinct.ideas.also.have.more. objective.reality.(their.object.is.more.separable),.Descartes.concludes.that. the.object.of.our.idea.of.God.must.have.more.objective,.formal,.or.eminent.reality.than.that.of.any.other.idea .But.the.object.of.the.idea.of.God. 14.Note.that.there.is.a.certain.gap.in.Descartes'.argument.as.presented.here .He.starts. from.the.claim.that.all.our.ideas.of.substances.are.objectively.distinct,.but.makes.use.of. the.converse.statement:.that.all.distinct.ideas.are.ideas.of.substances .The.second.does.not. follow.from.the.first;.however,.there.may.be.independent.reasons.for.its.truth 19B. HENNIG: Substance, Reality, and Distinctness is.not.a.further.idea,.and.so.does.not.have.objective.reality;.and.the.only. thing.with.enough.eminent.reality.to.produce.God.is.God.himself .This. means.that.God.has.more.formal.reality.and.is.more.separable.from.other. objects.than.anything.else .And.to.be.separable.from.other.things,.at.least. to.this.extent,.is.surely.the.same.as.to.be.a.substance Why.and.in.what.sense.is.the.mind.a.substance?.The.reason.is.certainly.not.that.Descartes.conceives.of.the.mind.as.something.like.a.material. thing,. as. Ryle. assumes. (1949:. 11–24);. for,. according. to. Descartes,. material.things.are.less.substantial.than.the.mind .Rather,.the.reason.is.that. if.the.mind.were.not.a.substance,.it.would.be.not.a.res,.but.an.accident;. accidents,.however,.do.not.think .If. there.is.a.thinking. thing,. then.there. is.also.a.thinking.substance .In.the.course.of.the.first.three.Meditations,. Descartes.demonstrates.that.the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing.is.distinct.enough. to.qualify.as.the.idea.of.a.separable.res .The.first.two.Meditations.show. that.the.idea.of.the.thinking.subject.can.be.developed.without.referring.to. any.other.substance. than.God;.and.the.Third.Meditation.shows.that. the. idea.of.a.subject.of.doubt.is.not.separable.from.the.idea.of.God .Even.at. this.stage,.however,.no.reference.to.any.other.substance.is.required,.and. thus. the. idea.of.a. thinking.substance.depends.only.on. the. idea.of.God . The.introduction.of.the.idea.of.extension.in.the.Fifth.Meditation.requires. more.preliminaries,.while.the.ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.feelings,.and.the. union.of.body.and.mind,.as. introduced.in. the.Sixth.Meditation,.depend. on. still. other. ideas .The. series. of. steps. in. which. the. different. ideas. of. substances,.attributes,.and.modes.are.introduced.roughly.mirrors.the.hierarchy.of.separability .To.be.a.substance,.however,.is.to.be.independent.of. other.substances;.hence.the.thinking.thing.is.the.second.most.substantial. thing.we.can.imagine Why.are.mind.and.body.two.different.substances?.It.should.first.be. noted.that.Descartes.does.not.claim.that.mind.and.body.are.actually.separate;.he.only.claims.that.God.may.separate.them.(III.265–6,.VII.12–13) .In. any.case,.to.call.the.mind.a.thing.(res).is.to.call.it.a.substance,.since.only. substances.are.things;.and.to.call.it.a.substance.is.to.imply.that.it.is.separable.from.other.substances .To.the.extent.that.a.thing.is.a.substance,.it.is. separable.from.other.things.except.God.and.the.corresponding.principal. attribute .If.the.body.is.another.thing.than.the.mind,.it.must.therefore.be. separable.from.the.mind .Descartes.claims.to.have.shown.that.the.attributes. of.thought.and.extension.can.each.be.grasped.clearly.and.distinctly;.and. since.the.idea.of.an.attribute.is.as.distinct.as.the.idea.of.the.corresponding.substance,.we.can.thus.have.different.distinct.ideas.of.mind.and.body . Further,.the.idea.of.thought.is.more.distinct,. in.an.objective.sense,.than. the.idea.of.extension,.since.the.idea.of.extension.is.not.among.its.presupposed.contents.(and.has,.in.turn,.more.presupposed.content) .This.may.not. 20 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008 be.true.for.such.modes.of.thought.as.imagination.and.sensory.perception,. since.both.depend.on.the.human.body;.but.it.is.at.least.true.for.the.ideas. that.Descartes.introduces.in.the.first.two.Meditations .The.ideas.that.the. meditator.has.of.herself.as.a.thinking.thing.and.of.God.are.(objectively). distinct.from.the.idea.of.extension .Our.idea.of.a.thinking.substance.does. not.have.any.presupposed.content.other. than.the.idea.of.God .For.Descartes,.this.implies.that.mind.and.body.are.two.separable.substances References Arnauld,.A . and. Nicole,. P . 1992 . La logique ou l'art de penser. (Paris:. Gallimard) Code,.A .1986 ."Aristotle:.Essence.and.Accident",. in:.Grandy,.R .E .and.Warner,.R .(eds ),.Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends (Oxford:.Clarendon.Press),.411–439 Cronin,.T .1987 .Objective Being in Descartes and Suárez (New.York:.Garland) Flasch,.K .1986 .Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter.(Stuttgart:.Reclam) Gewirth,.A . 1943 . "Clearness. and. Distinctness. in. Descartes",. Philosophy. 18:. 17–36 Hoffman,.P .1990 ."Cartesian.Passions.and.Cartesian.Dualism",.Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.71:.313–330 Kemmerling,.A .1996 .Ideen des Ichs: Studien zu Descartes' Philosophie.(Frankfurt:.Suhrkamp) Marion,.J -L .1996 ."A.propros.de.Suárez.et.Descartes",.Revue Internationale de Philosophie.50(195):.109–131 O'Neill,.E .1987 ."Mind.Body.Interactionism.and.Metaphysical.Consistency:.A. Defense.of.Descartes",.Journal of the History of Philosophy.25:.227–45 Ryle,.G .1949 .The Concept of Mind (Chicago:.University.of.Chicago.Press) Strawson,.P .F .1959 .Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.(London:. Routledge) Wells,.N .J .1993 ."Descartes'.Idea.and.Its.Sources",.American Catholic Quarterly.67(4):.513–